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Abstract.  Efforts to understand the successes and limitations of civil society institutions have inspired a 
growing literature on social networks, social capital, and the role that social relationships play in 
developing group norms supporting collective action and in linking groups to network-based resources.  
The literature has tended to emphasize broad egocentric networks or informal networks of community 
organizations, largely ignoring the importance of social capital for supporting engagement of the formal 
participatory institutions that are arising as a way of improving stakeholder input in many cities.  The 
extant research on community-representing organizations has tended to conceptualize social networks in 
largely metaphorical terms, and has not systematically investigated the manner in which political 
networks support their operations.  This paper argues that differing forms of network resources will 
support distinct types of activities undertaken by participatory organizations.  Our empirical analysis 
demonstrates that different network resources are employed in different contexts, while suggesting that 
civil society organizations must overcome basic organizational hurdles related to internal conflict in order 
to leverage latent network resources. 
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Introduction 
 
 In the face of increased political polarization and declining trust in government, localized 
mechanisms for civic engagement in governance are held to cure an array of democratic ills.  
Despite widespread disenchantment with the community engagement provisions of the War on 
Poverty, neighborhood representing organizations have grown in number and importance during 
the latter twentieth century.  In many cities these have been formalized into governance 
institutions that attach community-representing associations to urban policy making processes 
(Berry, Portney et al. 1993; Thomson 2001; Fung 2004).  It is argued that these formalized 
institutions for community participation in governance increase the quality of citizen 
participation and represent localized interests, in turn increasing the responsiveness and 
accountability of policy within large urban entities.  Others stress the potential of community-
representing associations to provide forums for deliberation and advice, or to mobilize resources 
and advocate for neighborhood positions in a manner that may counter central-city elite policy 
influence (Ferman 1996; Fung 2004)  
 Many of the theorized benefits of community participatory institutions rest implicitly on 
assumptions that they create positive social network effects, effects that have received limited 
systematic empirical validation to date.  This paper explicitly considers how the network 
structure of neighborhood-representing organizations in Los Angeles affects their political 
efficacy along several dimensions of civic associative activity.  The paper is situated within a 
growing literature that considers how network relationships influence a broad range of political 
activities including civic engagement, political campaigns, policy development, and service 
delivery (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Scholz, Berardo et al. 2008).  
The particular focus of the paper is on formal participatory institutions, generally ignored in the 
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social network literature.  Its contribution is a textured consideration of the manner in which 
network structures support differing facets of collective civic action within such institutions.     
 Social capital is important to the function of participatory institutions, because these are 
typically hybrid organizations—municipal governance systems populated with volunteers—and 
hence confront the collective action dilemmas common to volunteer organizations.  For example, 
group efficacy can be impeded by shirking behaviors that tend to be mediated by bonds of trust 
and norms of generalized reciprocity found in strong social networks (Coleman 1990; Putnam 
2000).  Effective engagement with policy also requires information resources that arguably can 
be leveraged through the development of outward-reaching ties among community-representing 
associations, stakeholders, and city entities (Burt 2000; Scholz, Berardo et al. 2008).  Within 
cities that are increasingly diverse, networks potentially have an important role to play in 
overcoming group conflict and fostering coherence between elite and mass opinions (Mutz 2002; 
Mutz and Mondak 2006; Weare, Musso et al. 2010).   
 Our understanding of these critical roles of social networks to effective democratic 
participation are generally inferred from literatures that have examined related but distinct 
contexts for collective action including the role of ego-centric relationships on voluntarism (Lin 
2001; Lin 2008), broad community-level studies relating overall community networks and 
outcomes (Sampson and Groves 1989; Hill and Matsubayashi 2005; Hipp and Perrin 2006), 
collaborative networks between social service organizations, and issue networks (Provan and 
Milward 1995; Esparza 2007; Scholz, Berardo et al. 2008).  In contrast, there has been quite 
limited empirical work that links network effects to the political efficacy of participatory 
institutions in a systematic fashion.  This constitutes a large gap in our understanding because the 
influence of social structures on organizational efficacy depends on the social context of the 
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organizations, including the goals they pursue and the opportunities and constraints presented by 
the environment within which they operate  (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Galaskiewicz 2007).    
 This paper bridges this gap by focusing on how network-based resources influence the 
organizational performance of participatory institutions.  We theorize that distinct forms of 
network-based resources – bridging and bonding social capital as well as varying forms of 
brokerage – are differentially accessed as participatory institutions engage in a diverse range of 
activities – promoting political participation, mobilization, and building a sense of community.  
We further argue that internal factors such as conflict mediate the ability of these organizations 
to leverage networks effectively.   
The next section of the paper frames local participatory institutions within network terms, 
and develops hypotheses regarding the differential role that network resources play in supporting 
various dimensions of organizational performance.  This is followed by a description of our 
empirical focus, which is a network survey of the elected board members of 85 advisory 
neighborhood councils in the City of Los Angeles.  We then present our findings followed by a 
concluding discussion.   
Explaining Efficacy in Participatory Civic Networks 
 Despite Putnam’s (1995, 2000) diagnosis that there has been a decline of social capital in 
the form of informal voluntary association, there is evidence that local civic associations have 
continued to grow during the 1980s and 1990s (Berry et al., 1993; Cooper & Musso, 1999; 
Cunningham & Kotler, 1983).  Moreover, many cities in the United States have created 
participatory institutions intended to engage community-representing entities formally within 
processes of policy formulation and service delivery.  It is argued that these participatory 
institutions can improve representation of localized preferences by mobilizing citizens to express 
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their concerns and interests, help establish a balance of power with broader economic forces, and 
promote citizen influence over local government activities (Cunningham & Kotler, 1983).  Berry 
et al. (1993) found that neighborhood involvement in government improves the quality and 
efficacy of citizen participation; reduces alienation and strengthens trust in government; 
increases tolerance and reduces destructive conflict; cultivates a sense of community; and 
enhances government responsiveness to its citizens.   
Local civic participation is particularly important given an increasing urbanization of the 
American population that is accompanied by a national trend toward decentralization of services 
that began in the late 1970s and has continued to the present (Musso, 1998).  In this light, local 
participatory systems can be understood as a means of addressing the governance challenge 
facing most modern metropolitan regions:  how to accommodate and respond to geographically 
compact community interests while also addressing the needs of the broader region (Box and 
Musso. 2004).  At the same time community engagement faces severe challenges, as 
neighborhoods are hotly contested spaces in the American urban politics of growth and 
development (Mollenkopf 1983; Ferman 1996).  As Peterson (1981) argues, economic 
competition within American federalism orients urban policy toward development and supports 
domination of alliances involving political officials, businesses and developers.  At the 
neighborhood level, local participatory institutions inevitably experience conflict as the 
economic development prerogatives of the city encounter residential concerns about quality of 
life.  Social capital may serve an important role in assisting the members of these groups to work 
together in democratizing urban political processes that are impenetrable to most community 
members (See also Evan and Boyte 1992).  
A Network Frame for Participatory Institutions 
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 This paper understands participatory institutions to serve as mediating structures that 
connect in complex ways to stakeholders, city institutions, and to one another, shown in Figure 
1, next page.  Within the network system differing network structures support distinct types of 
civic activities and goals.  For example, creating and reinforcing community identity likely 
require dense networks within councils, and between the association and community 
stakeholders, to facilitate cohesion and build a sense of group belonging.  Creating and 
reinforcing community identity entails building a sense of group belonging and development of 
boundaries between the group and its environment (Coleman 1990; Hipp and Perrin 2006).  As 
Diani and his co-authors (2004, 2007) suggest a combination of dense local network 
relationships with strong horizontal bridging connections is important for creating social 
movement identity.  At the same time, these dense ties may be impeded to the extent that group 
heterogeneity divides communities along socioeconomic or ethnic lines (Katznelson 1982; 
Alesina and Ferrara 2000). 
 The community capacity literature (Chaskin, Brown et al. 2001; Chaskin 2002; Chaskin 
2003) also suggests that networks of civic associations can play an important constitutive role by 
creating or reinforcing a sense of community identify and commitment.   Neighborhood 
institutions can partner with city entities to produce local public goods and services through 
processes of co-production.  Moreover community networks are held to support local advocacy 
and exertion of power by representing community interests to policy makers. 
 Despite a growing body of theory pointing to the importance of network-based resources 
to support collective action by civic organizations, there is limited study of the extent to which 
differing types of social capital support their direct engagement in governance.  Several 
6 
 
Figure 1:  Network Conception of Community Representing Institutions 
 
prominent works on civic associations and social capital focus on the important civic effect of 
the social relationships developed within these associations (Granovetter 1973; Putnam 1993; 
Putnam 2000).   Following these works, however, there has been limited study of participatory 
institutions with the growing body of theoretical and empirical research focusing on the political 
effects of network structures.  Studies with a network focus have tended to focus on arenas other 
than direct engagement in governance, such as individual level networks, community systems, 
and informal organizational networks.  Much of the literature on community representing 
organizations have either treated networks metaphorically or ignored them altogether (Berry, 
Portney et al. 1993; Sirianni and Friedland 2001; Fung 2004).  The question considered by the 
current paper is the manner in which social network structure supports performance of 
neighborhood-representing organizations within a formal participatory network, a neighborhood 
council in the City of Los Angeles. 
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 The existing social network literature has generally connected individual and system 
level political performance with a range of social structural characteristics including network 
cohesion or bonding social capital, weak ties or bridging social capital, network diversity that 
increases access to resources (Lin 2001; Lin 2008), and brokerage that connects disparate regions 
within a network (Gould 1989).  The research on individual egocentric networks generally 
supports the important role that networks play in fostering individual political participation, and 
the particular value of networks for encouraging voluntarism and fostering tolerance (Guest and 
Oropesa 1986; Mutz 2002; McClurg 2003; Son and Lin 2005; Son and Lin 2008).  This literature 
suggests that engagement in diverse and wide-reaching individual networks supports a virtuous 
cycle of self-reinforcing participatory behaviors.  These findings ignore, however, how the 
structure and deployment of network relationships lead to effective group level behavior.   
 A second set of system-level studies consider how community social structures influence 
civic attitudes and behaviors, or investigate informal organizational networks and the effects of 
organizational ties.  Community level studies emphasize the importance of both weak ties 
(related to bridging social capital) and dense networks for system level outcomes.  For example, 
bridging-type social capital is found to align mass and elite policy preferences (Hill and 
Matsubayashi 2005) and increase city-level cohesion (Hipp and Perrin 2006).  Dense networks—
related to bonding social capital—are important for developing neighborhood level cohesion.  In 
addition (Sampson and Groves 1989) find that denser friendship networks and associational 
memberships are related to lower levels of crime and juvenile delinquency.   
 These findings resonate with Ostrom’s (1990) work on collective action.  Although she 
does not take a network perspective, her emphasis on the importance of monitoring and the 
maintenance of group norms follows closely with Coleman’s (1990) emphasis on the importance 
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of dense, bonding networks.  What the studies ignore is how the network positions of individual 
level organizations facilitate organizational level success.  Moreover we are left without 
guidance as to how policy interventions might be designed to foster collective action as policy 
can be targeted toward organizations but system interventions are harder. 
 A third clustering of studies at the organizational level tend to focus on informal 
networks of social service providers or policy networks.  These studies suggest that differing 
types of networks promote distinct elements of collective action.  For example, Scholz (2008) in 
a study of estuary watershed policy networks distinguishes the effects of dense networks to build 
trust from the manner in which weak ties support search for potential collaborative partners.  
Agranoff (1998) found that in the case of economic development collaboration, networks differ 
in supporting different functions such as policy making, resource exchange, or collaboration on 
projects.  Crenson (1978) found that in loosely knit communities (those with weak ties, in 
network terms), there was higher agreement between the goals of associations and those of 
individuals.  Moreover network integration is found to improve system performance in a number 
of different domains, including estuary policy (Scholz, Berardo et al. 2008), homeless services 
(Esparza 2007), and mental health services (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Sebastian 
1998).  These effects are attributed to the effects of network ties in improving coordination, 
sharing of information, and collaboration.   
 This literature is mixed, however, as to the relative importance of weak and strong ties.  
Within community political networks Galaskiewicz (1979) shows that organizational centrality is 
more influential than resources for activation during the agenda setting phase of policy making, 
although  centrality does not increase an organization’s influence on the eventual decision.   
Laumann and Pappi (1976) find that community social structure has a major impact on mass-
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elite relationships with common social bonds being an important predictor of network closeness 
of the mass and elites.  In contrast, Safford (2009) finds that dense civic networks can impede 
collective action to address a systemic threat to a community whereas bridging networks 
between civic associations and business elites are critical to mobilization. 
 The lessons from these various network studies are somewhat difficult to connect, and 
may not be readily applicable to the question of how network positions and structures influence 
the efficacy of community-representing organizations as they engage in city governance.  While 
the policy network and community power literatures are valuable, there are important differences 
between issue networks and networks of civic associations.  First, social service and issue 
networks are more clearly goal directed in that connections are united by common foci (e.g. 
delivery of services to a particular population; a particular policy problem or goal), (Esparza 
2007; Provan, Fish et al. 2007).  In contrast while members of participatory institutions may have 
common goals that can support collaboration, they can and do pursue a more diffuse set of goals 
and at times their goals directly conflict, as when associations line up on different sides of 
particular issues.   
Second, civic associations are also notoriously fragile organizations.  They often collapse 
when the key members leave, and their capacity waxes and wanes as internal conflicts divert 
their attention and the voluntary contributions of members vary.  Even in successful systems of 
community councils it is common to see a large number of councils being dysfunctional or 
inactive  (Putnam and Feldstein 2003).  These problems associated with the liability of newness 
suggest that emerging civic associations must first attain some level of internal coordination and 
external legitimacy before they can survive and achieve collective goals (Singh, Tucker et al. 
1986).  Early handicaps can impede organizations from effectively employing network-based 
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resources, leading to differences between latent network of relationships captured by socio-
metric surveys and action networks in which relationships are leveraged for collective goals 
(Galaskiewicz 2007).  Studies have shown that emergent and less stable service or policy 
networks are more likely to fail and less likely to provide informational benefits to well 
positioned actors (Laumann, Knoke et al. 1987; Human and Provan 2000). 
Research Hypotheses 
The literatures on community capacity and on participatory institutions have recognized 
the broad range of activities and goals of pursued by participatory institutions (Berry, Portney et 
al. 1993; Chaskin, Brown et al. 2001; Chaskin, Brown et al. 2001).  They seek to promote 
political participation by providing deliberative venues and connections to organs of governance.  
They can produce needed local goods and services through coproduction or collective action.  
They support community advocacy by representing community interests to policy makers and 
service providers, and they can create or reinforce community identity and commitment.  
The varied forms of network resources discussed in the literature – including bonding 
social capital, bridging social capital, brokerage, and access to network based resources – are to 
some degree fungible in that relationships developed in one context may be applied to other 
activities (Adler and Kwon 2002).  We argue nevertheless that particular forms of social capital 
support distinct associational goals and activities.  Whereas bonding social capital developed 
through dense in-group relationships supports collective action and helps organizations to 
overcome the liability of newness, we argue that it should be most important in constitutive 
activities:  creating a sense of community and promoting political participation.   
Beyond the need to develop some base level of group cohesion necessary for all activities 
particular types of relationships are more important.  To promote participation, community 
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representing organizations need to act as brokers between community stakeholders and city 
officials, thereby providing a capacity for action that promotes participation.  To do so they must 
recruit potential activists in the community, develop a capacity to deliberate on salient issues and 
maintain active relationships with city officials (Verba, Schlozman et al. 1995).  To produce 
community-based goods and services civic associations primarily need to leverage community 
resources and city level resources.  This would seem to require a broad and diverse network that 
connects community representing organization to a variety of resources (Lin 2008).  Community 
advocacy and exertion of power requires representing community interests to policy makers and 
service providers.  This entails gathering information about community concerns, keeping 
abreast of emerging city issues, and mobilizing resources.  Creating and reinforcing community 
identity entails building a sense of group belonging and development of boundaries between the 
group and its environment. Stated as hypotheses: 
H1: Community representing organizations are better able to promote political 
participation when they have cohesive internal networks, dense ties to city officials 
and dense ties with neighborhood stakeholders. 
H2: Community representing organizations are better able to organize collective action to 
address neighborhood problems when they have cohesive internal networks and 
broad and diverse links to a variety of network-based resources. 
H3: Community representing organizations are better able to represent community 
interests to policy makers when they have cohesive internal networks and have low 
constraint and broad and external networks that effectively link them to diverse 
sources of information. 
H4: Community representing organizations are better able to promote a sense of 
community when they have cohesive internal networks and dense networks with 
community stakeholders.   
Additionally, as community-representing associations become more established by developing a 
consensus on their goals and regularizing internal organizational processes, they are more likely 
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to benefit from the shared norms developed through network cohesion and are better positioned 
to leverage their networked resources.  Stated as a hypothesis:   
H5:  Community representing organizations that are more established in terms of age and 
established organizational processes are better able to leverage their network-based 
resources to achieve their goals. 
Data and Methods 
 This study focuses on a 1999 neighborhood governance reform in Los Angeles that 
created a city-wide system of community-representing, voluntary associations.  The charter 
reform established the councils as advisory, and the broad range of goals that they might pursue, 
directing the system to promote participation, represent the diverse interests within each 
community, and make government more responsive to local needs.  The councils were self-
organizing.  Communities set their own boundaries, developed by-laws, and applied to the city 
for certification.  The city provided some resources, most importantly a staff of community 
organizers that help with organizational issues and a $50,000 yearly grant to each council for 
organizational operations and community projects. At present, the system consists of 88 self-
organized councils. The average council has a 21-member, elected volunteer board and 
represents a community of about 38,000 residents.  
 The neighborhood governance system in Los Angeles has experienced a mixed success.  
An evaluation of their performance after 7 years of operation found many councils still 
struggling with operational challenges and internal strife (Musso et. al, 2007).  The elected 
boards under-represent Latino residents relative to population, and have experienced some 
difficulty establishing their legitimacy with city officials (Ibid.).  Also, early broad support for 
councils by residents weakened after they were in operation for a number of years.  Nonetheless 
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the system has resulted in political networks that connect councils to city policy bodies and to 
each other.   
 One measure of their political prominence is the number of references they receive in the 
press.   For example, Figure 2 shows that although the Los Angeles Times covered neighborhood 
councils in 1998 when the provisions of the new charter were being debated, coverage was 
almost non-existent between 2000 and 2004 as the neighborhood councils were forming.  Since 
2004, neighborhood councils are much more likely to be cited in major news stories.   
Figure 2:  Neighborhood Council Mentions in LA Times News Section 
 
 The network data analyzed in this study come from a 2006 survey of neighborhood 
council board members.  The survey included items concerning board members’ political 
attitudes, political activities, and demographic information.  Because of the range of activities 
that can be undertaken by these boards, the survey included both roster-based items designed to 
collect whole network data and items akin to position generators that captured the range of 
contacts that neighborhood councils maintained with outside organizations.  At the time of the 
survey, there were 85 certified boards, though two were not active and were dropped from the 
survey.  Project members attended board meetings to describe the survey and its purposes.  The 
web-based survey was initially emailed to all members and two follow-up emails were also sent.  
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After this initial wave, non-responders were contacted by phone to take the survey on-line or 
could complete the survey on the phone.  To accommodate the large number of new immigrants 
in Los Angeles, respondents were able to take the survey in Spanish and Korean.  There were a 
total 1499 board members at the time and 702 took the survey, for a response rate of 47%.   
Measures 
 Four batteries of questions collected the main components of the network data.  The first 
two collected whole network data on internal board communications and inter-board contacts.  
The first presented respondents with a list of all other members of their council board. They were 
then asked: “Thinking about the two weeks just before your most recent neighborhood council 
meeting, which board members were you in touch with during that time to discuss matters 
concerning politics, government, or neighborhood issues?”  The second battery presented 
respondents with a list of all of the other neighborhood councils, and they were asked to 
nominate up to six with which they had been in contact during that two week period.  The third 
and fourth items collected information on the range of city and neighborhood groups with which 
the member was in contact.  The third included lists of city offices (e.g. mayor, city council, city 
departments) and the fourth listed stakeholder groups (e.g. homeowners, social service agencies, 
businesses), and respondents were asked which of these groups they had been in contact.   
 The dependent variables measuring the success of neighborhood council collective action 
are taken from a self-evaluation included in the survey.  Respondents were asked to rate the 
performance of their council on four dimensions: 1) promoting citizen participation in 
government, 2) working to solve problems in the neighborhood, 3) advising the City on citywide 
policies, and 4) creating a sense of community.  The ratings were on a 4-point scale ranging 
between poor (1) and excellent (4).  The scores for each neighborhood council are the average of 
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all respondents from each council.  While objective measures of council performance would be 
preferable, these council members are the best informed individuals concerning their activities.  
In any case we have some verification of the validity of these measures based on similar 
performance ratings by the community organizers that worked with the councils.  Although we 
were only able to collect information on a subset of councils, three of the four measures are 
positively correlated with the council self reports with correlations ranging between .27 and .50.  
Only in the case of evaluations on promoting citizen participation do these ratings disagree.2 
 Based on these data, we calculated a range of network measures.  To capture the degree 
of bonding social capital within each board, we calculated the mean out-degree for board 
members.  We employ mean out-degree instead of the more common density measure because it 
is robust against differences in the size of boards and the differing response rates of boards.  To 
capture the degree of brokerage between community stakeholders and city offices we calculate 
mean city contacts and mean stakeholder contacts for each board.  We also calculate a total 
groups variable that sums the total number of different city offices and stakeholder groups 
contacted by a board as a measure of the range of network resources available to a board.   
 To measure the position of a board within the broader neighborhood council network, we 
constructed an interboard network that aggregated the individual-level responses concerning 
contacts with other boards.  We then employed UCINET VI to calculate interboard constraint 
based on Burt’s (2000) measure of the degree to which a board is connected to redundant alters.  
Lower scores for this measure indicate that a neighborhood council bridges more structural holes 
                                                 
2 This disagreement may relate to differing perspectives on the task of promoting participation, 
as the city organizers generally assessed councils in terms of their ability to reach out to diverse 
and underrepresented groups, an evaluative norm not necessarily shared by council board 
members. 
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thereby gaining access to novel information.   
 We also include a number of control variables.  To assess the ability of younger boards to 
leverage their network assets productively, we include a dummy variable, newer board, that is 
equal to 1 for boards that were certified less than 3 years prior to our survey.  Additionally, 
internal conflict measures the degree to which the effective operation of a board is hampered by 
conflict amongst its members.  This measure was an index of the proportion of board members 
reporting internal conflict in an open-ended question on the major challenges facing the 
respondent’s council.    To control for differing capacities of neighborhood councils and pre-
existing social capital, we include the average education of board members and an index of 
associational membership.  This membership index is calculated for each individual is based on 
the number of civic associations the person is a member and the level of involvement with each, 
ranging from a past member to a current member with a leadership position.  This index is then 
averaged over all board members. 
    Finally, we include a measure of the degree of community heterogeneity.  
Heterogeneity has been theorized to affect civic participation, but the direction of the effect is 
debated (Oliver 1999; Alesina and Ferrara 2000).  It may constrain civic participation due to the 
difficulties that individuals often face in engaging in collective action across racial or class 
differences, but it may increase participation if increased competition over public resources spurs 
civic interest.   Our measure of heterogeneity is based on indices of dispersion calculated for 
race, income group, and educational attainment in each community.  The three indices are then 
combined into a single measure employing principal components factor analysis.   
 Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for these variables.  On all measures there is 
there is a significant amount of variation over the 83 councils in our sample.  On the average 
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council members had about 6 six contacts with other board members, but this ranged between 
only 1.29 to as many as 12.75 contacts.  Similar variation is found with the average number of 
contacts with the city and with community stakeholders.  The average board was in contact with 
14.2 different city and stakeholder groups (out of a possible 19 groups listed in the position 
generator items), while the least connected councils only was in contact with six different groups 
and the most connected council was in contact with all possible groups.  The measure of 
interboard constraint ranges between .12 and 1.  A third of boards have been certified for less 
than 3 years.  Because these councils tend to attract more educated and engaged individuals, the 
average education and index of associational memberships are both quite high on average. The 
average board member has a college education and multiple associational memberships with 
leadership positions in those associations.  Nevertheless, there a wide amount of variation 
between council in terms of education levels and associational memberships. 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for 83 Neighborhood Councils 
  
 
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
Promoting more citizen participation  2.42 1.13 4.00 0.49 
Working to solve neighborhood problems  2.80 1.25 3.67 0.53 
Advising the City on citywide policies 2.45 1.00 3.75 0.47 
Creating a sense of community 2.57 1.25 4.00 0.57 
Mean Out-degree 5.91 1.29 12.75 2.29 
Mean City Contacts 2.47 1.00 7.25 1.02 
Mean Stakeholder Contacts 2.07 0.25 4.33 0.84 
Total Groups 14.20 6.00 19.00 3.24 
Interboard Constraint 0.35 0.12 1.00 0.15 
Newer Board 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.47 
Average Education 15.89 12.00 17.43 1.15 
Index of Associational Memberships 13.97 5.50 24.25 3.35 
Neighborhood Heterogeneity 0.02 -2.72 1.26 1.00 
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Analysis 
 
To examine how council network structures influence various dimensions of 
organizational performance, we regress the four ratings of council performance on the network 
measures and control variables employing ordinary least squares.  The four models are presented 
in Table 2.  Considering the entrenched difficulties of measuring the organizational performance 
of civic associations given their complex and often conflicting goals, the first three models 
performed well, explaining between 22% and 28% of the variance.  In contrast, the fourth model 
performs less well, perhaps indicating the difficulties that councils face in creating a sense of 
community in a large, diverse city such as Los Angeles.  In terms of the control variables, most 
of them -- Newer Board, Average Education, and Index of Associational Memberships – do not 
influence perceived performance in any of the four models.  Neighborhood Heterogeneity is 
related to better performance in terms of working to solve neighborhood problems and advising 
the city, suggesting that it fosters civic participation as argued by Oliver (1999).   
While the results are mixed, the findings concerning the effects of associational networks 
do provide broad support for the expectations outlined in our hypotheses.  For promoting citizen 
participation internal cohesion and a denser set of ties with community stakeholders are found to 
affect council performance positively.  Contrary to expectations, though, councils that have 
denser ties to city offices actually perform worse in terms of promoting participation.  While we 
hypothesized that ties with government agencies would promote participation by increasing its 
likely benefits, it is possible that this finding indicates that councils that are more city-focused 
spend less effort in reaching out and organizing the stakeholders that they represent. 
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Table 2:  OLS Regression Results for Types of Associational Activities 
 
Model I 
Promoting more 
citizen participation 
in government 
Model II 
Working to solve 
neighborhood 
problems 
Model III 
Advising the City on 
citywide policies 
Model IV 
Creating a sense of 
community 
  B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error 
Constant 1.704* 0.942 1.157 1.020 2.845* 0.878 2.184* 1.185 
Internal Cohesion 0.066** 0.027 0.056* 0.029 0.072*** 0.025 0.057* 0.033 
Mean Stakeholder Contacts  0.222** 0.093 -0.007 0.101 0.072 0.087 0.155 0.117 
Mean City Contacts -0.146** 0.072 -0.032 0.078 -0.032 0.067 -0.059 0.091 
Total Groups -0.005 0.026 0.019 0.029 -0.012 0.025 -0.029 0.033 
Interboard Constraint 0.163 0.370 -0.162 0.401 -1.050*** 0.345 -0.015 0.466 
Newer Board 0.015 0.121 0.068 0.131 -0.042 0.113 0.102 0.152 
Average Education -0.009 0.052 0.061 0.057 -0.035 0.049 -0.008 0.066 
Index of Associational Memberships 0.026 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.026 0.021 
Neighborhood Heterogeneity 0.018 0.057 0.131** 0.062 0.108** 0.053 0.036 0.072 
R2 .229 .218 .276 .099 
*** p < .01   ** p < .05  * p < .10 
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 Model III that examines advising the City also shows strong network effects.  Greater 
cohesion and lower levels of constraint strengthens councils’ ability to provide advice.  These 
results support our expectations that the advisement role requires both bonding social capital that 
facilitates collective action and bridging social capital that enables the council to collect 
necessary information to actively participate in the policy making process.  Counter to 
expectations, though, greater density of contacts with the city does not appear to improve the 
ability of councils to provide advice to the City.  
Models II and IV that seek to explain the success of boards in solving neighborhood 
problems and creating a sense of community perform less well.  In each case, internal cohesion is 
positive and weakly statistically significant, indicating that bonding social capital is also 
important for these types of activities.  Nevertheless, the other sets of relationships theorized to 
play an important role in board performance are not found to have positive effects.  For solving 
neighborhood problems, we theorized that access to a broader set of resources in a boards 
network would be helpful, but neither the total number of groups with which a board has contact 
nor the range of associational memberships displays a statistically significant association with 
performance.  In terms of creating a sense of community, the density of contacts with 
stakeholders is not significant, though we do not find that community heterogeneity impedes the 
development of a sense of community. 
To investigate whether internal board operations may impede or facilitate their ability to 
leverage network assets effectively, we ran another set of analyses on the same dependent 
variable and included the measure of internal board conflict.  See Table 3.  For each model, we 
included the internal conflict variable as well as that variable interacted with the network 
measures that were statistically significant in our original models.  Unfortunately, these 
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Table 3:  OLS Regression Results for Types of Associational Activities, Models Including Controls For Internal Conflict 
 
Model I 
Promoting more 
citizen participation 
in government 
Model II 
Working to solve 
neighborhood 
problems 
Model III 
Advising the City on 
citywide policies 
Model IV 
Creating a sense of 
community 
 B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error B Std. Error 
Constant 2.246** 0.915 1.667* 0.943 3.547*** 0.872 2.586* 1.157 
Interaction – cohesion x conflict -0.043†††, ‡‡ 0.084 0.141
*,†††, ‡‡
 0.084 0.021†††, ‡‡‡ 0.077 0.133†††, ‡ 0.104 
Interaction – stakeholder contacts x conflict -0.249†††, ‡‡ 0.286       
Interaction – city contacts x conflict 0.295†††, ‡‡ 0.230       
Interaction – constraint x conflict     -2.030
**,†††, ‡‡‡
 0.923   
Internal Conflict -0.573*,††† 0.658 -1.519***,††† 0.534 0.229††† 0.542 -1.327*, ††† 0.655 
Internal Cohesion 0.070
*, ‡‡
 0.036 0.002‡‡ 0.038 0.054‡‡‡ 0.034 0.007‡ 0.046 
Mean Stakeholder Contacts  0.290**, ‡‡ 0.135 0.001 0.092 0.060 0.084 0.161 0.113 
Mean City Contacts -0.223
**, ‡‡
 0.092 -0.023 0.071 -0.036 0.064 -0.051 0.088 
Total Groups 0.005 0.026 0.016 0.026 -0.013 0.024 -0.031 0.032 
Interboard Constraint 0.368 0.373 0.212 0.380 0.012‡‡‡ 0.546 0.299 0.466 
Newer Board 0.081 0.117 0.108 0.120 -0.089 0.113 0.134 0.148 
Average Education -0.043 0.051 0.048 0.053 -0.081 0.050 -0.016 0.065 
Index of Associational Memberships 0.027 0.017 0.024 0.018 0.013 0.016 0.035 0.022 
Neighborhood Heterogeneity 0.053 0.055 0.159*** 0.058 0.137** 0.052 0.057 0.071 
R2 .354 .365 .364 .183 
Test of individual significance   *** p < .01   ** p < .05  * p < .10 
Test of joint significance conflict term and interaction terms  †††p < .01   ††p < .05   †p < .10 
Test of joint significance network term and interaction with conflict  ‡‡‡ p < .01   ‡‡p < .05   ‡p < .10 
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interaction terms introduce a great deal of multicollinearity into the models, complicating 
inference for individual coefficients.  Consequently, we also present the joint significance for 
two groups of variables:  1)  the internal conflict variable and all of the interaction terms 
including that variable, and 2) the interaction variable including internal conflict and a network 
measure and that network measure. 
The inclusion of internal conflict and associated interaction terms is significant at the .01 
level in all four models.  In three of the models the coefficient for internal conflict is negative, 
indicating that the internal conflict on boards does hamper goal achievement.  The general results 
concerning the impact of networks n council success in the four activities remain stable.  The 
interactions between internal conflict and the network measures, however, are complex and often 
counter to expectations.  We hypothesized that boards with less well developed internal 
operations would be less able to leverage their network assets productively.  The expected 
negative coefficients for the interaction terms, however, only arise in Model I.  There as internal 
conflict increases in dampens the benefits for internal cohesion and dense stakeholder contacts in 
terms of promoting political participation.  Even in this model, boards with higher levels of 
conflict benefit more from their city contacts.  
In Models II-IV, internal cohesion is found to have an even more positive impact on goal 
achievement when there are higher levels of internal conflict.  In Model III, the inclusion of the 
interaction term between internal conflict and interboard constraint reduces the direct effect of 
interboard constraint significantly, and the negative and statistically significant coefficient for 
the interaction term indicates that the benefits lower constraint, and therefore access to a richer 
set of information from contacts with other boards, actually increases for boards that are affected 
by higher levels of internal conflict.   
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Discussion and Conclusions 
These results provide overall support for the theoretical arguments of the important roles 
that interpersonal and interorganizational relationships play in fostering collective action within 
participatory institutions.  The strength of the network results is highlighted when compared to 
the average education of board members.  While socio-economic status in frequently found to be 
one of the most important predictors of civic involvement (Verba 1967; Verba, Schlozman et al. 
1995; Valelly 1996), in these models the network assets of the civic organizations are found to 
be much more important for facilitating collective action.  In particular, the consistently positive 
impact of internal cohesion on organizational performance demonstrates the importance of 
bonding social capital or strong ties to enabling informal, voluntary organizations to work 
together productively.   
These results also demonstrate the importance of differentiating different dimensions of 
networks and different types of organizational activities.  Previous studies have shown the need 
to differentiate between the content of relational ties, be it information exchange, resource 
exchange, advice, friendship, or authority (Galaskiewicz 1979; Krackhardt, (ed) et al. 1992).  
Our analysis complements this insight by also demonstrating the importance of distinguishing 
between internal versus external associational networks and differentiating between different 
parts of qualities of the external network.  For example, bridging structural holes (e.g. having 
low constraint) in the interboard network provided councils with informational advantages that 
enable councils to provide advice to the city which is an instrumental and information intense 
task.  In contrast, these external networks were less important to the goals of promoting 
participation and creating a sense of community, which are more constitutive than instrumental 
tasks and appear less related to information provided by other boards.   
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The results are nuanced and suggest that organizational capacity mediates the usefulness 
of network-based resources.  Internal conflict certainly impedes associational performance in 
particular domains, although it does not necessarily impede the use of network resources.  In 
three of the models (II through IV) internal conflict actually made network relationship more 
valuable.  For the internal cohesion interaction terms it appears that denser internal consultation 
is particularly important for overcoming disagreements.  So, that amongst boards experiencing 
conflict, it is those that have higher levels of internal cohesion are the ones that can achieve 
important goals despite the conflict.  In contrast, in the case of promoting citizen participation 
internal conflict does weaken the efficacy of network linkages most likely because boards 
experiencing conflict are viewed negatively by stakeholders, making them a less viable avenue 
for participation.  The reason why internal conflict makes councils with less constrained 
interboard networks more effective is less clear.  This result possibly may indicate some level 
endogeneity in that boards seeking to be involved in city-level advice giving are more likely to 
encounter conflict as they work toward a position on the issue and also seek out information and 
advice from other boards.  
In other ways the results do indicate how particular contextual factors can challenge the 
ability of participatory institutions to leverage network-based assets.  For example, counter to 
expectations it is not the case that goal achievement is furthered by the number of different 
groups with which a council maintains relationships.  In Los Angeles the councils under study 
represent quite large communities of an average of 40,000 people, and this size has impeded 
their ability connect with other civil society or social service organizations (Musso, Weare et al. 
2007).  This general detachment from other associations may account for why we do not observe 
a positive relationship between the range of relationships and the ability of councils to solve 
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local problems. Also, neighborhood councils in Los Angeles have experienced contested 
relations with the city, with council members feeling that they are not afforded the attention they 
deserve and the city questioning the legitimacy of councils to represent their neighborhoods.  
These tensions may color the vertical ties between councils and the city, explaining why denser 
connections to the city actually decrease the ability of councils to promote participation, again 
counter to expectation.  This suggests that network relationships can have both positive and 
negative valence, a nuance not generally addressed in the literature.   
This study is constrained by a number of limitations of the data.  Most importantly, the 
use of cross-sectional data does not permit us to establish causation.  It is possible that the pursuit 
of particular goals entails the creation of a particular set of relations, nevertheless the correlation 
between networks and specific activities does demonstrate that importance of relationships for 
civic action.  We also rely on self reported perspectives on group efficacy which may lead to 
spurious correlations at the respondent level.  (“I talked to a lot of people in the city so we must 
be doing a good job on advising the city”).   To check on this possibility, we analyzed council 
performance on the subset of councils for which we had performance ratings by the city 
organizers who work with the councils.  These analyses were qualitatively similar to the ones 
presented here, though most of the results did not attain statistical significance because of the 
much lower number of degrees of freedom.   Future research should focus on attempting to link 
network effects to less subjective external measures of network performance, and focus on more 
longitudinal studies of network formation and outcomes. 
From a policy standpoint the results suggest that the long-run effects of democratic 
reforms will hinge on the types of network relationships that develop from institutional reforms.  
Internal cohesion appears a very strong indicator of system success, while external ties related to 
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bridging social capital appear more important to the advisory functions of the boards than to 
goals related to community capacity.  The results in particular highlight the dangers associated 
with the liability of newness, suggesting that strong system support is necessary to assist such 
organizations to overcome group conflict in working toward common goals. 
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